Between 2017 and 2019, the phenomenon of massive migrations of Venezuelan people to its neighbor countries, particularly those of the Andean region, and Brazil to a lesser extent, have been observed. Given this considerable cross-border movement of human groups, it is important to mention that for many years Venezuela has historically been a receiving rather than sending country of migrants, as noted by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in various reports. Unlike other countries in the region, at least since the middle of the 20th century, Venezuela has experienced a massive immigration process of people from Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. Two moments stand out: the first, with a European majority, between 1950 and 1960; and the second, of a South-South nature, between 1960 and 1990.¹

In contrast, the Andean countries have not historically been recipients of migrants, so the presence of Venezuelans is a novelty for their populations and for the economies of these countries, due to their low capacity to absorb foreign labor. In this sense, what has happened is that the vast majority of Venezuelan migrants have had to join the informal economy, with all that this entails in terms of lack of labor and social protection, pigeonholing and stigmatization of the migrant population, which has led in some countries to an outbreak of xenophobic manifestations by sectors of society and government authorities themselves against this population.

The term xenophobia refers to hatred, suspicion, hostility and rejection of foreigners; it is an ideology that consists of rejecting cultural identities different from one’s own. The Durban Declaration and Program of Action, the international community’s plan to take action to combat racism, signed by consensus at the 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, establishes that States have the primary responsibility for combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, as well as to develop national and comprehensive plans of action for any manifestation of such violence and to adopt policies and programs to combat hate speech in the media, including on digital platforms.²

Despite this mandate, the authorities of the main host countries of Venezuelan migrants have been, on several occasions, the main promoters of xenophobia against this population in a situation of human mobility. Emblematic cases are the statements of the mayor of Bogotá, Claudia López, those of the Ecuadorian president, Lenín Moreno, or those of the president of Colombia, Iván Duque, who announced that he would exclude Venezuelans who are in an irregular situation in that country from the process of mass vaccination against the COVID-19. 

One of the most serious incidents was recorded in Brazil in 2018, when a group of protesters, in the Pacaraima municipality, in the state of Roraima, forced some 1,200 people of Venezuelan nationality to cross the border back to Venezuela, in addition to destroying the camp where they were staying and burning their belongings³. This incident was especially symptomatic of the tense situation in some places due to the presence of migrants.

In January 2019, there was the murder, in the middle of a public street, of a woman at the hands of her partner, presumably of Venezuelan nationality, an event that shocked that nation, partly due to the inaction of the police who had the opportunity to prevent the death. In addition to the fact that the events themselves were regrettable, President Lenín Moreno reacted in an unfortunate way. He pointed out that the borders had to be reviewed, and added: “we have opened the doors to them [alluding to Venezuelan immigrants], but we will not sacrifice anyone’s security”. In addition, he ordered the formation of brigades to control the legal situation of Venezuelan immigrants in streets, workplaces and border crossings⁴.  Thus, Venezuelan migrants ended up being associated with violent crimes, which is a clear case of promoting xenophobia.

In Peru, one of the countries that has received the most migrants of Venezuelan origin in recent years, there have been numerous xenophobic statements by municipal authorities, as well as abuses by police officers in some districts of Lima. One of the most relevant xenophobic expressions were the statements made by Congresswoman Esther Saavedra, who requested President Vizcarra to close the border with military force, and to expel the entire Venezuelan population, both “good” and “bad” people, in order to prevent Peru from becoming the migratory playground of the region. He alluded that a million Venezuelans, including workers and criminals, were taking jobs away from Peruvians⁵.

Recent manifestations of xenophobia and discrimination against the Venezuelan population in that country are alarming, as is the case of the xenophobic march that a group of people held on February 20 against Venezuelan immigrants and refugees, transmitted live through digital platforms and justified by the murder of a Peruvian in Colombia, allegedly at the hands of a Venezuelan citizen of Venezuelan nationality. Likewise, the headquarters of the Venezuelan embassy was attacked with rocks and blunt objects, breaking windows and causing material damage to its facilities (fire of the signage, among others)⁶.

The situation is similar in Chile, where Venezuelan people have denounced being subjected to xenophobic violence, discriminatory policies and severe restrictions to access formal jobs, public health systems and public aid due to their irregular migratory status. It is worth highlighting an episode that took place during the month of June 2020, when the government of Sebastián Piñera announced, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the implementation of a “Humanitarian Plan of Orderly Return” so that migrant populations established in Chile could return to their countries of origin.

The condition to be eligible for this program would be the signing of an affidavit in which these people would renounce their residence in the country, any request for refuge, and in which they would assume the commitment not to return to Chile for a period of 9 years. In view of this, different pro-migrant organizations denounced the xenophobic nature of such program, being a direct attack against the freedom of movement of people and against the right to migrate to other places, and harming, mainly, millions of workers in the world who move from one country to another to look for better job opportunities⁷. After receiving harsh criticism, on June 12 the program was suspended by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the wave of protests that took place in various countries in the region in 2019, Venezuelan migrants were frequently accused of causing situations of disturbance of public order. In this regard, it is noteworthy that 59 Venezuelan nationals were arrested and expelled from Colombia, accused of generating violence during the protests and participating in looting in the city of Bogota. A similar event occurred with 17 Venezuelans in Ecuador, who were accused of being involved in protests and allegedly possessing information about the transfers of President Moreno, all within the framework of the protests against the increase in fuel prices in that country. Something similar happened in Bolivia with the expulsion of nine Venezuelans for alleged links with former president Morales. Finally, another nine Venezuelans were expelled from Chile in the context of the protests against the increase in subway fares in the city of Santiago.

Within these contexts, discursive constructions begin to be created that will be reproduced through different governmental and non-governmental actors, and fundamentally through the media, which will delineate a type of subject marked by labeling and stigmatization. This framework of discursive constructions around the immigrant, various specialists in the region have denounced these actions with xenophobic practices.⁸ 

Beyond the social demonstrations against immigration, it is worrying when it is the authorities who promote xenophobia, without considering that their management must abide by national and international legislation on human rights of migrants, and that their decisions must have some basis in reality. Thus, for example, the notion that Venezuelan migration is related to crime in Colombia is unprovable in light of the available data, as has already been made known to public opinion.

On the other hand, using the anti-immigration discourse to try to obtain votes is reprehensible from a democratic point of view, and irresponsible because of the potential consequences that this could entail both for the migrant population and for their own nationals, since it weakens democratic institutions, as history shows.

It is important to mention that Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Chile have ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families of 1990, as well as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966, which is why they are internationally obliged to protect against all forms of discrimination and xenophobia against migrant populations.   

In this regard, on February 19, the Ombudsman’s Offices of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru issued a joint communication requesting to facilitate the mobility of Venezuelan migrants, adopt measures for regularization and avoid their social and economic exclusion, as well as the homologation of such policies. Likewise, they consider that due to the persistent closing of borders as a consequence of the pandemic, the risks of irregular migration fall on people of Venezuelan origin, just as there is an increase in expressions of intolerance, xenophobia and aporophobia that stigmatize and criminalize the migrant population.⁹    

References

1 ECLAC (2020), “Regional, local and individual dimensions of Venezuelan migration: the case of the border with Roraima (Brazil)”, in Notas de Población No.110. Available at: https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45807/1/S2000236_07_MOTA.pdf

2 The Durban Declaration and Programme of Action at a glance”. Available at: https://www.un.org/es/durbanreview2009/pdf/ddpa_at_a_glance_en.pdf

3 BBC (2018), “Attack on Venezuelans in Brazil: riots in Pacaraima against immigrant camp”. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-45240028

4 La Vanguardia (2019), “Indignation in Ecuador with the murder of a pregnant woman”. Available at: https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20190121/454221784604/asesinato-ecuador-mujer-embarazada-diana.html

5 El Nacional (2019), “Peruvian congresswoman calls for the exit of Venezuelans: ‘They come to take our jobs away”. Available at: https://www.elnacional.com/mundo/congresista-peruana-pide-la-salida-de-venezolanos-vienen-a-quitar-trabajo

6 Somos Tu Voz (2021),”Xenophobic March in Peru attacked the Venezuelan Embassy with stones”. Available at: https://www.somostuvoz.net/destacado/marcha-xenofoba-en-peru-ataco-con-piedras-embajada-de-venezuela

7 La Izquierda Diario (2020), “Xenophobic ‘Humanitarian Plan’ of Piñera for the return of stranded migrants”. Available at: http://www.laizquierdadiario.com/Xenofobo-Plan-humanitario-de-Pinera-para-retorno-de-migrantes-varados

8 BBC (2019), “How Venezuelans are becoming the scapegoat for the protests in South America”. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50559187

9 El Comercio (2021), “Ombudsman’s Offices of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru request to facilitate Venezuelan migration”. Available at: https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/defensorias-pueblo-colombia-ecuador-venezolanos.html

The process of human mobility recorded in recent times in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is from the 1980s onwards that a discreet but growing phenomenon of Venezuelan migration to northern countries began. Since then, there have been substantial variations in the migratory destinations chosen by Venezuelan-born people, as well as in the profile of migrants. However, massive migrations per se have only been registered in this country since 2014.

Venezuelan migrations since the 1980s had been characterized by being mostly female, concentrated in people from middle and high socioeconomic strata, and having countries such as the United States, Spain and Italy as migratory destinations. After 2015, it became evident that Venezuelan emigration was mostly male, concentrated in people from middle and low socioeconomic strata, and where the countries of migratory destination became, fundamentally, Latin America and, more specifically, Colombia, Peru and Chile, although also with an important presence in countries such as Ecuador and Argentina.

It is precisely the history of Venezuela as a country of migratory destination that marks the destiny of its own emigrations. It can be seen that the return migration of nationals from southern European and Latin American countries has facilitated the formation of migratory networks, so that return migration drags along Venezuelan migration without dual nationality, largely due to the effective integration that the country offered to its immigrants in past decades.

Another factor that has contributed to stimulate emigration resides in the binational migratory agreements, which, with legislation inspired by reciprocity, facilitated Venezuelan migration processes to countries that were historically expellers of human groups to Venezuela. Likewise, the importance of the free transit agreement within the framework of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which in practice allowed the movement of people throughout South America, cannot be ignored. In recent years, however, these facilities have been suspended due to obstacles erected for the control of Venezuelan migrations.

It should be noted that since 2014 an economic, financial and commercial blockade has been active against Venezuela, this being the most important factor contributing to emigration: the devastating effects of the package of unilateral coercive measures imposed against Venezuela, of a U.S. and European nature, has generated a serious and massive violation of a wide range of human rights of the Venezuelan population in view of their inability to access food, medicines and quality public services.

Regarding Venezuelan migration figures, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN) Population Division and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have shown difficulties in establishing a measurement of Venezuelan migratory flows due to the weight of return migration¹ and people with dual nationality. This has caused differences in the UN agencies’ own statistics of almost 100% for 2019. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) acknowledges that their own registration is not reliable, and they point out that a person is likely to be counted multiple times because it is not a biunivocal registration, so that the same person may be registered as many times as they cross the same border on different occasions. It also does not differentiate international emigration from circular and pendular migration flows (which, among others, include people who cross the border and return in a short time, for commercial, labor, educational or health reasons).

The Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants (R4V), clarifies in each update report that its figures are not based on biunivocal records, through the following tagline: “this figure represents the sum of Venezuelan migrants, refugees and asylum seekers reported by host governments It does not necessarily imply individual identification, nor registration of each individual, and includes a degree of estimation” (R4V, 2019). However, despite the important methodological clarification, the Platform’s press releases and reports give the figure the quality of being the number of “Venezuelans” abroad, without taking into account the risk of overestimation that this entails. Hence the figure of 4.5 million migrants that is often quoted in the international press.

Based on such figures, governments, political sectors, non-governmental organizations, multilateral agencies and the media do not usually refrain from disclosing exaggerated and overestimated figures of Venezuelan migrants, trying to equate such migration with a “refugee crisis”, thus preventing the phenomenon from being known in its multiple dimensions.

Notwithstanding the above, the trend of Venezuelan migration to the region has now shown an abrupt turnaround during 2020. Even months before the beginning of the health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, more than 200,000 people returned to Venezuela, mainly from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil, by all possible means, as a result of massive evictions, dismissals, violence and discriminatory acts against them. There have been numerous complaints made by Venezuelan migrants about the little or no attention received by the authorities of those countries, not to mention the fact that this population has not benefited from social protection plans, nor has a regional plan been contemplated to guarantee their safe transfer to Venezuela.

The socio-demographic and labor characteristics of the Venezuelan migrant population, the scarce information they have on the risks, opportunities and conditions of the places of destination, as well as on the strategies for incorporation into the labor market (given the conditions of departure of some of these people), are factors that may condition vulnerability with respect to the protection of their human rights in the countries of destination, due to discriminatory behavior, xenophobia, scarce access to health and education services, lack of employment, labor exploitation and human trafficking.

References:

1 In this regard, it should not be overlooked that data for 1987 indicated that the foreign-born population residing in the country reached 7.40% of the total population, with a significant presence of people of Latin American nationality. On the other hand, in relation to Europe, the National Institute of Statistics of Spain reported return migration processes of Spaniards or descendants of Spaniards born in Venezuela.

Millions of people in different regions of Colombia have been victims of forced displacement for more than 50 years in a context of confrontation between various armed groups and organized drug trafficking gangs for the control of strategic territories, disputes over land tenure, elimination of small property and destructuring of the agrarian economy, development of macroeconomic projects and the loss by the Colombian State of its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Thus, large contingents of human groups, predominantly farmers, have been forced to move involuntarily and unplanned from rural areas to urban centers and metropolitan areas of Colombia, resulting in a socio-demographic reordering of the Colombian territory and the formation of a city model of high socio-spatial segregation in which strong socioeconomic contrasts coexist (Villa, 2006; DANE, 2000).

According to data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2019 there were 79.5 million displaced persons in the world as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events that seriously disrupted public order (UNHCR, 2020), and a total of 45.7 million internally displaced persons. Colombia is, followed by the Syrian Arab Republic, the first country with the largest number of internally displaced persons, with nearly 8 million¹, and with a number of migrants living abroad was estimated to be at least 4.5 million people by the end of 2015.

According to the Guiding Principles on Forced Internal Displacement, the first United Nations document dedicated to the issue of internally displaced persons, displaced persons are defined as:

… [Those] who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (UNHCR, 1998).

The Colombian State first recognized the problem of forced internal displacement during the administration of former President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), through the enactment of Law 387 1997: “Law for the Attention of the Displaced Population”. Two years before the publication of this instrument, in 1995, the existence of a significant and silent exodus began to be known in the country, which by then exceeded half a million people, most of them farmers who, due to different types of harassment, mostly associated with the armed conflict, had had to leave their homes (Villa, 2006). In July 1997 the Colombian Congress approved Law 387 1997, which defines, in its Article 1, that:

A displaced person is any person who has been forced to migrate within the national territory, abandoning his or her place of residence or habitual economic activities, because his or her life, physical integrity, personal security or freedom have been violated or are directly threatened, on the occasion of any of the following situations: Internal armed conflict, internal disturbances and tensions, generalized violence, massive violations of Human Rights, breaches of International Humanitarian Law or other circumstances emanating from the above situations that may drastically alter or alter public order. (UNHCR, 1997)

The document establishes that all Colombian nationals who are victims of forced displacement have the right to request and receive international assistance, to enjoy internationally recognized fundamental civil rights, to benefit from the fundamental right to family reunification, to return to their place of origin and to have their freedom of movement subject to no restrictions other than those provided for by law. It also established the creation of the National System of Integral Attention to the displaced population victims of armed violence, with the objective of developing and implementing public and private programs, projects and plans aimed at the integral attention of these vulnerable groups; to their reincorporation into Colombian society and to mitigate the effects of the processes and dynamics that cause displacement.

The roots of this situation can be found in the late 1940s, when the internal wars and the bipartisan liberal-conservative violence unleashed after the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (1948) started a massive exodus of peasant population to the capital and other cities of the country, a situation that lasted until the 1960s, with the emergence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and which worsens from the 1980s “with drug trafficking, the counterinsurgency war deployed by the military forces and the impulse of self-defense organizations, which degenerated into paramilitary groups and private justice apparatuses” (González, 2018). Research indicates that the cases of forced displacement registered during the 1990s produced one of the largest humanitarian crises in the history of Colombia: “41% of those affected point to guerrillas as responsible for their displacement, 21% to paramilitaries, most of them congregated in the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, and 0.8% to State agents” (González, 2018). It is estimated that 87% of the total displaced population comes from rural areas (CNMH, 2015).

From this complex picture has derived the need for millions of Colombian people to mobilize within the territory to safeguard their lives and achieve better economic and social conditions. According to the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), Colombia is organized into six regions² and, in turn, is divided into 32 departments and 132 provinces (characterized by shared geographical and cultural characteristics). Within this mapping, we have, for example, the Eje Cafetero, located in the center-west of the country and made up of the departments of Quindío, Risaralda and Caldas, has been a territory especially affected by the armed conflict. It is a strategic zone for illegal armed actors and for the establishment of large estates and megaprojects, due to its abundance of natural resources and its privileged location between Bogotá, Cali and Medellín, and violence such as displacement and dispossession have been a constant in these dynamics (Truth Commission, 2020).

Researchers agree that forced displacement in Colombia, more than a consequence of the land tenure problem and the armed conflict, constitutes a war strategy applied by various armed actors to maintain control over territories with strategic resources. The strategies applied for the expulsion of the population and control over the territory include massacres, persecutions, selective assassinations, armed takeovers of towns, recruitment of young people and prohibition of movement and practice of several activities (Villa, 2006).

As a result of these forms of violence, non-voluntary mobilization to urban centers has become the main type of human displacement in Colombia (urban-rural), although in recent years it has been recognized that there has been a transfer of the armed conflict to the main urban centers of the country (Bogotá, Medellín, Barranquilla and Cali), giving rise to a new typology of human mobility of an intra-urban nature. (Villa, 2006). Confinement has also been one of the strategies implemented by the irregular groups in the dispute for territories, subjecting the native population to measures prohibiting exit and movement, exercising control over external institutions entering the regions and surveillance over food supply, and through the planting of anti-personnel mines surrounding the localities (Villa, 2006, p. 20).

This complex landscape, in which a wide range of human rights of the Colombian population are violated by various actors, poses challenges to civil society, state institutions and international organizations, in view of the need to draw lines of action in terms of public policies aimed at the comprehensive care of these vulnerable groups, which, moreover, are characterized by a wide heterogeneity. Likewise, the implementation of measures adjusted to the current and real circumstances of these human contingents necessarily requires an in-depth analysis of the historical, economic and social causes that have originated and maintained the presence of these internal migratory flows over time, despite the various programs, plans, frameworks and legal instruments adopted by the country’s administrations in recent decades.

References:

1 According to UNHCR, the exact figure is 7,976,412. According to the Unidad de para la Atención y la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, the figure is 8,101,759 internally displaced persons.

2 Caribbean region; Coffee Axis and Antioquia region; Pacific region; Central region; Plains/Orinoquia region; Amazon region.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has pointed out that the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the region aggravated the already high levels of inequality, labor informality, lack of social protection and vulnerability present in Latin American and Caribbean countries, characterized by weak and fragmented social protection systems and the presence of marginalized urban settlements with limited access to public services.¹

On the other hand, the region also has the second highest number of deaths from the virus after Europe, with 601,256 deaths. By March 8, 2021, Brazil and Colombia were the countries with the highest number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil leads with 11,019,344 infections, followed by Colombia with 2,276,656 cases². Of this figure, 2,180,777 were recovered; 6,598 people died; and around 30,000 cases remain active, according to data from the Colombian Ministry of Health.

In the face of the unprecedented crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Iván Duque has implemented a series of restrictive measures aimed at halting the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, such as confinement, quarantine, preventive isolation and mobility restrictions. However, international organizations and academic studies have warned that such measures have led to a considerable increase in poverty and inequality globally, with people working in the informal economy who depend on the income they generate on a daily basis being the main victims. 

On March 12, 2020, six days after the confirmation of the first case of COVID-19 in Colombian territory, government authorities declared a state of sanitary emergency to contain the virus, and subsequently, on March 24, a mandatory national quarantine for 19 days, a measure that by that date had only been adopted in the region by the governments of Venezuela and Argentina. In the Colombian case, the quarantine was requested by various health sector organizations, which urged the government, in a public letter, to apply “more drastic measures than those taken to date, to avoid the disastrous changes in epidemiological indicators that have been a constant feature of this crisis”.³

Decree 457 provided for the restriction of the free movement of persons and vehicles within the national territory, the suspension of domestic air transportation and the imposition of criminal sanctions (such as fines and imprisonment) on those who violated the regulations. As was to be expected, these measures had negative effects on economic activity and, consequently, generated the loss of jobs and income for a large sector of Colombian society, historically marked by inequality, discrimination and social exclusion.

While people in the middle and upper strata of the population have the socioeconomic conditions to cope with the isolation and confinement measures, those in the lower and lower-middle strata have seen their incomes particularly affected by the decline in informal employment and mobility restrictions, in addition to being exposed to a much greater risk of contracting the virus.⁴

This was the context that prompted a significant number of migrants of Venezuelan origin in Colombia to return to their country, precisely because this population survived mainly in the informal economy. However, as a consequence of the border closure measures, returnees were forced to use irregular crossing points, with all the risks that this entails.

Due to the return of Venezuelans in several countries in the region, people from Peru, Ecuador and Chile transited through Colombia and were forced to seek alternatives to the closed border crossings in order to reach Venezuela. It is estimated that more than 200 thousand people passed through the Colombia-Venezuela border between March and December 2020, many of them in very impoverished conditions.⁵

A study conducted by the Universidad de los Andes on the socioeconomic pattern in the city of Bogota showed that the most vulnerable socioeconomic groups are exposed to a higher incidence of COVID-19. For example, as of July 2020, in stratum 1 there were 93 infections and 3.1 deaths per 10,000 households; in stratum 2 there were 56.4 infections and 2 deaths; while in stratum 6 there were only 8 infections and 0.6 deaths. In other words, “more than 10 times the difference in infections between those at the top and those at the bottom”. Given the way in which the Venezuelan population was integrated into the Colombian economy, it can be assumed that this population responded to the characteristics of the lower strata, as well as their greater risk of coronavirus infection. This fact is confirmed by the information gathered by the Venezuelan health authorities through the devices installed at the border crossings since March 2020, where it was evident that as the months passed, the number of infected people coming from Colombia was increasing.⁶

On the other hand, the flow of migrants to the United States of America, passing through the Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama, was slowed as a result of the pandemic. However, it was recorded that between January and October 2020, Panamanian authorities intercepted 287 African migrants coming from Colombia, which is one of the transit countries. In 2019, this figure was around 5 thousand people. It should be taken into account that migrants from African and Asian countries usually travel by plane to a country bordering Colombia with tourist visas, and then enter Colombian territory and continue their journey to the north, paying coyotes at each border. The suspension of flights implied a drop in this flow.⁷

In this sense, the migratory dynamics in Colombia during the pandemic crisis have been clearly altered. On the one hand, there has been a return migration of Venezuelans, both from Colombia itself and from other countries in the region, and on the other hand, migration to Panama from Africa and Asia has been suspended, except for those who were already in the American continent at the time the suspension of intercontinental air traffic began.

References:

1 https://www.cepal.org/es/comunicados/pandemia-provoca-aumento-niveles-pobreza-sin-precedentes-ultimas-decadas-impacta

2 https://es.statista.com/estadisticas/1105121/numero-casos-covid-19-america-latina-caribe-pais/

3 https://www.eltiempo.com/uploads/files/2020/03/17/20.03.16%20-%20GREMIOS%20MEDICOS%20-%20Carta%20al%20Presidente%20Duque.pdf

4 https://www.france24.com/es/20200406-colombia-tela-roja-ayuda-coronavirus-pobreza-cuarentena

5 y 6 https://sures.org.ve/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/VISION-PANORAMICA-SOBRE-EL-COVID-19-Y-LA-MIGRACION-VENEZOLANA.pdf

7 https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/internacional/pese-a-peligros-en-rutas-africanos-eligen-america-para-escapar-de-crisis-y-pobreza-en-sus-paises-nota/   

The forced displacement of which the Colombian population has been victim for 50 years, with its origin in the bipartisan violence unleashed after the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and in the wave of drug trafficking violence and the counterinsurgency war during the 1980s, has had special and very specific connotations on the ethnic groups of that country, such as the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities¹. It is these human groups that have suffered the most from the effects of the cultural and psychosocial tearing apart produced by the process of relocation and deterritorialization left behind by forced migration. At the same time, the loss of territory brought by the Colombian internal conflict has altered different aspects of the life of the communities -economy, cosmovisions and cultural practices-, to which it is inextricably linked because it is a space endowed with a deep symbolic charge and multiple senses that organize reality².

The phenomenon of forced displacement in Colombia responds to a logic of concentration of agrarian property and territorial control by large landowners, armed groups and organized drug trafficking gangs, as well as to the development of megaprojects linked to investment in large infrastructure works and exploitation of natural resources carried out by national and transnational capital. In the midst of these struggles and alliances between various legal and illegal actors, Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities have been exiled and dispossessed of their ancestral territories, through practices that have led to serious violations of their human rights, marked by massacres, selective killings and people’s forced disappearances.³

According to figures from the Information System on Human Rights and Displacement (Sisdhes), created by the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (Codhes), a total of 32. 217 people were forcibly displaced in Colombia during 2020, being the Colombian Pacific (made up of coastal municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca) one of the most affected regions; only in one of the departments that is part of that region, Nariño, the largest number of displacement events was concentrated (30), leaving 11,470 people in this situation. Similarly, more than 50% of the victims of displacement belonged to different ethnic groups, with the Afro-descendant population having the largest number of displaced persons with 9,150, while 7,049 belonged to indigenous peoples.⁴

The Pacific is one of the regions most affected by the violence of armed groups and the criminal and illegal activities of drug trafficking gangs. Codhes specified, in a bulletin published in November 2017, that for that year this region concentrated 33% of the total of armed actions and breaches of International Humanitarian Law, in direct aggressions against the civilian population by unidentified illegal armed groups, the Public Forces, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and other dissident guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)⁵. Likewise, for the same year, the Colombian Pacific concentrated 68% of the massive and multiple displacements occurred nationwide⁶. According to the organization, this is due to the fact that this area, which gathers most of the titled Afro-descendant and indigenous reservation territories, constitutes the exit corridor for narcotics to other countries and concentrates the largest number of cultivated hectares of coca (Nariño and Cauca).

Recently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, called on Colombian authorities to take effective measures to protect the population from persistent violence throughout the country, emphasizing the need for the National Commission for Security Guarantees to develop a public policy to dismantle “criminal organizations that have been named as successors to paramilitarism and their support networks, as called for in the 2016 Peace Accord. It also urged authorities to conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all reported allegations of human rights abuses and violations, and to uphold victims’ rights to justice, compensation and reparations.⁷ 

In this regard, researchers in the field argue that one of the causes of the sustainability over time of this internal humanitarian tragedy lies in the weakness of the Colombian state apparatus. According to Ceballos Bedoya, the fragmentation and precariousness of the Colombian State’s institutional framework has been a constant in the nation’s history, a condition that would explain why State authorities are unable to exercise and maintain control over large portions of the national territory. “In a structured and operative State, forced displacement would not cease to be a sporadic, conjunctural event, without the configuration of a human catastrophe of such prolonged duration and uncontainable force as that of the Colombian experience”.⁸

In the absence of a solid institutional framework and the lack of a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence for the maintenance of internal order, Colombian society finds itself facing a vulnerable State, incapable of providing security and services. Thus, spaces are opening up for the emergence of parastatal dynamics that result in the dispute of different groups for power and are expressed in a generalized atmosphere of violence. According to information from the Instituto de Estudio para el Desarrollo y la Paz (Indepaz), for the period 2018-2019 there were 15 narco-paramilitary groups deployed throughout the Colombian territory with defined actions⁹ and with close links to the state apparatus. On this point, the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch has denounced for decades the active coordination between Colombian Army brigades, police detachments, government units and paramilitary groups in the common goal, among others, of combating the guerrillas. In the words of a Colombian municipal official, the relationship between the two actors constitutes “a marriage”.¹⁰

In an article published by the National Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (Afrodes), Marino Córdoba, human rights activist and director of the organization, narrates the events of December 20, 1996 and February 26 and 27, 1997 in the municipality of Rio Sucio, department of Chocó, an episode that went down in history under the name of “Operation Genesis” and which has been one of the bloodiest war actions carried out by paramilitaries and Colombian State institutions against the Afro-Colombian civilian population. There, the Colombian Army and paramilitaries joined forces in a supposed anti-subversive maneuver, establishing themselves in the area, exercising control over the movement of the population and food, improvising clandestine cemeteries and forcing the inhabitants to abandon their territory. Dozens of people were disappeared and killed, others had to flee for their lives. When the communities denounced the facts, “the full weight of the law fell on them, many were murdered and disappeared, others still have judicial processes and the communities have been and are stigmatized as collaborators of the guerrillas or paramilitaries”.¹¹

Faced with this dramatic picture of generalized violence, it is imperative to support the work that different Colombian civil society organizations have been carrying out for decades, aimed at implementing actions to raise awareness among the different sectors of national society regarding the urgent need to protect the Afro and indigenous populations of the country, particularly affected by armed violence. Likewise, to urge Colombian institutions to strengthen their commitment to monitoring and overseeing the State’s obligations to guarantee the protection of the fundamental human rights of the population in situations of forced internal displacement.

References

1 Elsa Rodríguez (2008), “Andean region: population dynamics and public policies – International meeting”, in UNHCR. Available at: https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Pueblos_indigenas/palau_2008_indigenas_afrocol_despl.pdf?view=1

2 Luis A. Arias (2011), “Indigenous and Afro-Colombians in situation of displacement in Bogota”, in Portal de revistas Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Available at: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/tsocial/article/download/28365/38859

3 To reverse forced exile: protection and restitution of territories usurped from the displaced population in Colombia (2006), in Colombian Commission of Jurists. Available at: https://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/libros_e_informes/revertir_el_destierro_forzado.pdf

4 Jennifer Gutiérrez & Francy Barbosa (2021), “Displacement in Colombia: What happened in 2020?”, in Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento. Available at: https://codhes.wordpress.com/2021/02/16/desplazamiento-forzado-en-colombia-que-paso-en-2020/

5 y 6 “Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento Codhes”, in Boletín Codhes Informa. Available at: https://codhes.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/boletc3adn-codhes-informa-93.pdf

7 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2020), “Bachelet urges Colombia to improve protection amid heightened violence in remote areas”. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26608&LangID=E

8 María A. Ceballos (2013), “Forced displacement in Colombia and its arduous reparation”, in Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, year 15, nº 29. Available at:  https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/51408659.pdf

9 Indepaz (2020), “Report on the presence of armed groups in Colombia. Update 2018 -2019”. Available at: http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/INFORME-GRUPOS-ARMADOS-2020-OCTUBRE.pdf

10 Human Right Watch (2001), “The ‘Sixth Division’: Military-paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia”. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/1.htm

11 Marino Córdoba (2020), “24 años de la operación Génesis, un genocidio que sigue impune en Colombia”, en Afrodes, 23/12/2020. Disponible en: http://www.afrodescolombia.org/operacion-genesis-marino/#more-4306